PROLOGUE: THE ARAB TRADER WARS
Isolated from the outside world, one might only speculate at the wonder of the first Nandi warriors who discovered the Arab caravan in the 1850's. Those warriors might not have known of earlier Arab caravans, because this was the first notable one in Nandi oral tradition. It was the time when the Sawe sub-sets were warriors and by 1854, the name Marmar ("to ornament a dress") had been conveyed upon a sub-set. The significance of this title might be derived from the major Arab defeat at Kipsoboi, but may have been attributed to the very successful raiding of Arab caravans by the Nandi. These were good years for the Nandi.
Part of the reason for the Nandi success was the limited access. The easiest approach was from the north-east, but a caravan had to travel two or three days before reaching principal Nandi settlements. This evidently was not preferable as the Arab caravans diverted east to Kavirondo and Mumias where food and protection was located. Since direct trade contact was not possible, the caravans after the 1850's rarely entered or camped in Nandi, a strange "middle man" system evolved.
Due to the casualties to the caravans, trusted Sotik and Dorobo agents were employed to act as "middle men". These agents would trade ivory and other coastal goods for cattle to the Nandi for a large commission. Enterprising Arab traders hoping to circumvent this arrangement often fell victims to a Nandi ploy. A few old Nandi warriors would meet the armed caravan and tell them that a large supply of ivory was only two or three days journey from the caravan. However, the Nandi were only willing to entertain a small Arab party to negotiate a trade. Dutifully, a party of twenty men would be dispatched with cloth, wire, and other trade goods only to be ambushed by the Nandi and massacred. Another ruse used by the Nandi was to send a small party of warriors to lead the prospective caravan into the depths of Nandi by the wrong road and then conduct a night attack. The Arab traders even attempted a tactic that had worked with other tribes, blood brotherhood. This consisted of sitting opposite one another, cutting the back of each other's hand and sucking the blood from one another's hand. The Nandi held no credence to such a foreign ceremony, and it only became another ploy to easily acquire coastal goods.
The Nandi developed tactics to overcome the effectiveness of a large number firearms during this time. Like the Masai, the warriors drew the enemy's fire by a sudden rush at which time they went "go to ground." Then the warriors charged the caravan porters before the muzzle loading weapons could be recharged. The porters bolted into the reloading riflemen followed closely by the Nandi warriors. In the confusion, the Nandi warriors could spear the panicked men. This tactic worked until the battle of Kimondi in 1895.
Frustrated by failures, the Arab traders attempted one last tactic. They established a series of fortified stations at Kimatke, Kibigori, Chemelil, Kipsoboi, and Kobujoi, and began a campaign of intimidation. Donkeys were let loose to trample the millet fields, Nandi warriors were humilitated, Nandi boys were imprisoned, and Nandi women and girls were compromised. At Kipsoboi four Nandi shields were propped against a tree and the Nandi were offered the chance to shoot arrows into the shields. Once this was accomplished, the Arabs fired musket balls through the shields that had stopped the arrows. The Arabs then poured gruel over the attending Nandi's heads and shaved off their cherished locks.
The Nandi warriors had had enough. They sought permission from the Kaptalam liabon (leading ritual expert) to kill the Arabs. He gave permission, and the post was stormed. Some accounts credit the laibon with making the defender's ammunition disappear, while others credit the error of the garrison commander to provide ammunition to the riflemen. Regardless of the reason, the garrison was destroyed. The Nandi kiptaiyat (raiding bands) then successfully attacked and slaughtered the garrison at Kobujoi. This was enough to force the Arab traders to withdraw from Nandi and to avoid the area. (Note: the ageset that did this was the Sawe and the Bororieet was Kaptaalam hence the two 'praises'; Sawe che bo ma rar maatab Kipsoboi and Kaptaalam che loklookyoonu ak gariik)
The defeat of the Arabs created the "Nandi legend." The Nandi were undefeatable. Porters could not be hired and expeditions could not be launched into Nandi for nearly forty years. The Nandi warriors stood proudly aloof from the events that were swirling around them confident to defend their independence.
DOOMED CARAVANS AND FAILED EXPEDITIONS
Like many of indigenous cultures, several Kalenjin prophets foretold the coming of the white man. Among the Nandi, the prophesies of Mongo and Kimnyole are best examples. However, it was only Mongo who foretold the arrival of white people who possessed a great power, and warned against fighting against them. Kimnyole, before his assassination, only predicted that the confrontation would have a significant effect upon the peoples of Nandi. Flushed with the victories against the other tribes and Arabs, the Nandi warriors believed that they would succeed in protecting their homeland.
This faith was substantiated in November 1883 when a European caravan under Joseph Thomson crossed Masailand into North Nandi. Thomson was part of a Royal Geographical Society expedition that numbered 100 men in a pioneer company. The confused and sketchy evidence of this expedition stopped the dispatch of European caravans from Mombasa from 1883- 84.
Evidently, Thomson had negotiated the west wall of the Kerio Valley and reached the top of the Elgeyo escarpment shortly after leaving Njemps on 16 November 1883. Thomson sent out scouts to prevent his caravan from being surprised as he continued forward five days without contacting any Nandi. However, the column must have been attacked by Masai seeking revenge for the cattle disease spread from European bovines in the area. This insignificant event attributed to a Nandi attack, actually broke the back of the Masai without any acknowledgement. Thomson returned to Naivasha in March 1884, and Nandi remained a blank spot on the European colonial maps.
The next European to cross Nandi was James Hannington, the first Bishop of Eastern Equatorial Africa. Hannington was an experienced explorer and employed the aid of other explorers like Thomson and Jones. The caravan left Rabai in July 1885, and arrived in Kabras on October 3. He left soon after to enter Nandi, but never returned. Thinking that he was opening a road to salvation for the Buganda, he could not know that his christian goals were the cause of his murder. The Mwanga believed that such an establishment of contact would open the Buganda to an invasion from the east.
Independently, Dr. Gustav Fischer entered North Nandi unobserved and passed through unmolested in March 1886. This was the first German expedition into Nandi and was so rushed that no notes were kept regarding the Nandi. The German Colonial Office also launched a powerful caravan led by Count Teleki and Hauptman Hohnel in 1887-88 that turned back before entering Nandi.
Three small European caravans had entered Nandi, but the only solid information was gathered from the Masai who Hannington related regarded the Nandi tribes "to be the most difficult to deal with from its fighting powers." Seven years passed before the next Church Missionary Society (CMS) caravan crossed Nandi.
Part of the reason that the Nandi were ignored during this period was that Emin Pasha and Stanley had to be retrieved and that used up the military, porters, and supply available in the area. Another part of the reason was that the British sphere of influence beyond the land of the Masai was being attempted.
The Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEA) launched a 535 man caravan led by F. J. Jackson into the unexplored area on August 6, 1889. The Sotik were friendly at first, but later attacked the caravan. The Sotik were defeated losing 40 warriors and forfeiting 170 head of cattle and 2000 sheep and goats. Jackson then continued to Mumias on November 7, 1889. Refusing to help the Mumia against the Ugenya, Jackson continued to Turkana to collect ivory to defray the cost of the expedition.
When the Jackson expedition reached the land of the Sebei it became acquainted with the Nandi. The expedition happened to be in the exact area that was being raided by Nandi kiptaiyat numbering possibly 1000 warriors. The Nandi attacked several Sebei villages and carried off 200 to 300 head of cattle in one day. The villages attacked were destroyed and the inhabitants killed. The expedition's hopes of being attacked by the Nandi never developed, and with the area devastated, the expedition had no hopes of remaining. It returned to Mumias on March 4, 1890. It was at Mumias that Jackson negotiated a treaty that replaced the German flag with the British flag.
In 1892, the railway survey party was appointed to determine the possibility of expanding the rail system through Nandi. The survey went slowly as the surveyors were in constant peril. It was estimated by some that "men armed with Winchester rifles would have to be stationed at every 100 yards in order to keep off the attacks of the natives."
The Europeans created a large amount of movement on the periphery of Nandi between 1890 and 1895. For instance, in 1894 twenty-six caravans passed through North Nandi and in the latter half of 1895 more than forty passed over the same tracks unmolested. The Nandi may have ignored this movement because it didn't directly threaten them or because the caravans did not offer enough plunder to make them worthwhile attacking. However, the Nandi watched the caravans with a suspicious eye. The coming of war was only a matter of time.
THE UNLIKELY BEGINNING OF A WAR
The unlikely beginning of a war began with two British adventurers, Peter West and Andrew Dick. West arrived at Mumias on March 20, 1895. He was a continual drunk and had been accused of being a gun-runner. He entered into a trading partnership with the choleric Dick who had already established a chain of stores and transport posts from the coast to Lake Victoria. These two men set about to independently establish domination and a trade monopoly with the Nandi.
The two began this escapade on June 23, 1895 by organizing two caravans. The expeditions began poorly when three rifles were stolen from Dick by the Kikelewa and one of West's men was murdered. Dick drew first blood when two Nandi warriors surrendered and he had them whipped. Later, Dick had the warriors bound and drowned. A Nandi reconnaissance party was later fired upon by Dick and dispersed after losing one warrior.
While Dick was busy antagonizing the Nandi, West had pitched his camp two hours from the nearest Nandi houses. West's total arms included fifteen guns, two privately owned rifles, and a revolver. West unsuccessful attempted to negotiate for the ivory that he sought upon his first contact with the Nandi. Although warned of the Nandi, West persisted in his attempts to negotiate by treating the Nandi delegates well.
West's efforts were repaid at two o'clock on the morning of July 16th, when the camp was rushed by Nandi warriors and all but eight of the expedition were killed without a shot being fired. West's last words were reported as, "Give me my gun." West's unprotected camp of fifty individuals, twenty-five head of cattle and forty-six sheep and goats had occupied the unprotected camp in safety for twenty days. West's death can only be contributed to his partner being a Dick.
The East Africa Protectorate, Foreign Office, and missionary societies administrations had no choice but to react militarily to West's murder. All roads bordering the Nandi were closed until military escorts could be organized from the scant resources at Mumias and Ravine. This disrupted several commercial enterprises and two major missionary efforts.
Before West's murder the various European administrations were content to ignore the unknown Nandi, and the Nandi were content to ignore the Europeans. After West's murder, the Nandi tribal morale and self-confidence increased. The Nandi warriors had proven that the European guns were no match for the Nandi spears. The warriors must have believed that the Laibon had rendered the guns useless. Maybe the ancient prophesy meant that the Nandi would begin the end of the "white man" in sub-Sahara Africa. This idea was reinforced by the reactions of neighboring tribes, most notably the Wanga and Kabras. The other tribes to join included the Kamasia, Kitosh and Kikelelwa.
The Ravine garrison received news of West's murder on July 30, 1895. The commander, Martin, had only a staff of forty invalided porters and a partly completed fort defended by ten askari. Fearing an attack, J. Martin enlisted seven Sudanese "settlers" and sent for help from Mumias. C. W. Hobley at Mumias could not comply because his scant military assets were being thinly spread. Port Victoria under A. Brown of Smith had been attacked on July 13, 1895. Hobley was forced to send twenty five askari of The Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) to support Brown of Smith. William Grant had been ordered to assist Hobley, but Grant was busy restoring order in Kavirondo. F. J. Jackson at Entebbe was also able to offer little help. Acting Commissioner Hobley did put together fifty Sudanese askaris of the IBEAC and some Baganda irregulars who he sent to aid Grant. Twenty-five reservists were enlisted in Singo to replace those men sent to Grant, and Singo became defended by released prisoners from Kampala. This was all that could be done.
Meanwhile, the Nandi roamed freely seeking likely targets. On July 15, a caravan under G. W. Lewis of Smith, Mackenzie and Company left Ravine with two European mechanics, twenty Indian artisans and over 400 porters. The caravan finally reached Mumias on July 26 having lost over twenty loads to a Nandi attack on the Uasin Gishu Plateau. Another Nandi ambush captured two rifles, a shotgun and a loaded donkey from the Uganda Commissioner's caravan near Kabras. Still another ambush on Bishop H. Hanlon's caravan captured the religious relics of Father Prendergast. News of these ambushes did not reach Ravine in time to stop a small advance party of the Boustead, Ridley and Company from departing with beads to purchase food for the Church Missionary Society main caravan of T. Munro and urgent letters for Mengo. The advance party consisted of twenty-five contract men and six porters. Two hundred Nandi warriors ambushed the unprotected camp at 2:00AM on August 22. Only seven members of the party survived and reached safety.
By July 30, the IBEAC agents knew that the Nandi had been incited to a war and took the appropriate measures, but could not warn other caravans in time. On October 2, a caravan under Mohamed Bau consisting of thirty rifles, two loads of spare ammunition, fifty head of cattle and twenty sheep and goats left Guasa Masa for Ravine. Two days out from Ravine the caravan was attacked during the night by ten Nandi warriors and suffered the loss of eight porters and a woman. Six men were wounded and four guns captured with 250 rounds of ammunition after only ten shots had been fired. Forty-two of the cattle were captured with the small stock and mail. The mail was returned sixteen days after the disaster.
Another well armed caravan under F. Pordage of 160 men were threatened by a large Nandi kiptaiyat on October 13 at their camp on the Kamasai River. During the night of October 14-15 the camp was surrounded by Nandi warriors, but Pordage was up to the task and order three volleys fired into the darkness by his askari. The result was the confirmation of two dead Nandi and several blood trails. After leaving Guasa Masa, ten Sudanese askari joined the caravan on the 15th and when the Portage caravan camped, several Nandi were discovered attempting to set fire to the grass surrounding the caravan.
During the afternoon of the 16th a water porter party was attacked by thirty Nandi warriors, but the rush was stopped by a volley from the five askari escorting the party. The Nandi retired without loss and contented themselves to watch the progress of the caravan outside of gunfire range until it reached Ravine on October 21, 1895.
Although there was one more successful attack by the Nandi on a fortified Kabras village, the Nandi appear to have been content with the success of their raids on the Uganda Road. The operations had been well planned and executed as the warriors had defeated several European caravans with the loss of only two warriors. When provided the opportunity, the warriors had decisively struck. When the Europeans had the advantage, the Nandi warriors possessed the discipline to avoid a costly attack. And all this was accomplished by raiding parties, not the combined might of the Nandi tribes.
The last months of the IBEAC forces was expended against the threats from tribes neighboring Nandi. The Protectorate military establishment numbered 1,200 Sudanese troops, 250 of which were reservists. The porter establishment was chaotic, and the arms and ammunition supply system was forwarded through Mumias from German East Africa or Kampala. Food stuffs were an entirely different problem as local purchases were minimal and the arrival of caravans was haphazard. The Nandi clearly presented a threat that the IBEAC could not effectively counter.
THE FIRST INVASION OF NANDI
In 1895, the crown took from the IBEAC the responsibility for the area including Nandi. Uganda became a separate protectorate and the Sudanese troops were reorganized into the Uganda Rifles Regiment (URR) under the Foreign Office administration. Established at 800 men, it was organized into ten companies. The 27th Bombay (Baluch) Light Infantry Regiment (BLI) was also deployed to the protectorate with ten companies.
After considering several options, Major G. G. Cunningham decided to invade Nandi with a field force of 400 askari of the I, IV, V, IX URR, with a Maxim, 600 porters, and 800 followers from Kampala. The huge caravan attracted a lot of attention as it marched to Mumias. The local natives were awed by the spectacle that was arrayed against the Nandi. At Mumias on October 29, Cunningham was joined by Dr. Mackinnon. The total column consisted then consisted of five Europeans, seven native officers, 367 askari, 23 Baganda "drilled and disciplined" auxiliaries, and a few armed "Swahili" porters in the Maxim detachment. After Captain C.H. Sitwell's column arrived, the number of askari increased to 428. This was more than one third of the total regular troops available in the protectorate.
All of the URR were rearmed with Martini-Henry rifles and one Maxim machinegun was allotted to each of the reorganized columns. There was plenty of ammunition and supplies, but one of the main problems was providing carriers. The local populations at Kavirondo and Mau were not willing to offer their services. In the end, only 110 Swahilis and 80 Lendus were available. As most of the Swahli were specialist carriers for the Maxim guns, and the logistics of supporting over a thousand people forced Cunningham to reduce the number of followers to 350. Even then, the size of the columns would force them to depend upon raiding ripened millet fields in Nandi.
Another problem Cunningham faced was the lack of irregulars acting as guides and a shield for the columns. Bribed with gifts of Nandi cattle, even the Masai refused to offer their services. This was most disconcerting as this had never before been a problem against other tribes neighboring the Nandi. Cunningham was forced to enter unexplored territory without the benefit of guides or skirmishers.
Undaunted, Major Cunningham sent the small force of a few Baganda irregulars under Sgt. Chongo with fifty Sudanese regulars to chastise the irreconcilables in the Kikelelwa forest. The forest was deserted and the houses were burned. The Nandi appear to have expanded to create a "burned" no man's land between the British protectorate and Nandi.
Cunningham then marched his column out of Mumias on November 4th. He detached F. G. Foaker with I Company (90 men), twenty reservists, and a number of porters to Guasa Masa as the main column continued east to the Kabras food depot. After marching south on November 8th, the column turned east again and reached the first Nandi huts on an escarpment 6,000 feet above the column. A patrol dispersed a number of Nandi warriors and continued southwards to a dense forest. This first encounter with the Nandi resulted in two askari shot, and sixteen Nandi cattle and nine goats captured.
On November 9th, the column retraced its path seeking a way either around the escarpment or the forest. Two miles to the north, Cunningham discovered a path which was used contested by Nandi snipers who rained arrows and rifle fire into the flanks of the column. Cunningham claimed four Nandi dead with a loss of one wounded Sudanese follower. However, Cunningham once he had reached the plateau, turned north and a party of Nandi were dispersed by his Maxim. He then sent a patrol to find Captain C. H. Sitwell's missing column.
Sitwell and Foaker left Guasa Masa on November 10th with 168 Sudanese askari, 51 porters, a Maxim, and a number of followers with directions to progress south for fifteen miles to join the Cunningham column at Kabiyet. Captain Sitwell was deceived by his Masai guides and ended his first day's march west instead of south. Sitwell believed that he had reached Kabiyet within a six hour march, and not finding Cunningham's main column, he camped over night.
While both Cunningham and Sitwell were ineffectively searching for each other's column, both became embroiled in increasing Nandi resistance. The Cunningham Column was running low on food by November 13th, and he decided to move back to where he thought the Sitwell Column might be. Patrols from Cunningham's column skirmished with Nandi attempting to protect the grain rich country the column had entered. The Nandi skirmished, but were dispersed by the Maxim losing one warrior killed by a patrol and another captured by foraging porters near Kombe, and foraging patrols accounted for three more warriors and one rifle southeast of the Kipsomoitei camp.
Then the Nandi Kiptaiyet main force fell upon the column near dark Company IV received the brunt of the Nandi attack when the Nandi got between a patrol sent west by that company and the company. The Company IV was forced to retire and send for reinforcements. IX Company was left to guard the camp and the battered IV and fresh V Company were sent to relieve the Baganda irregulars who had accompanied the IV company section southeast of the camp near the Kimondi River.
The relief companies could hear heavy firing as they neared the battlefield. Company V was held in reserve while a section of Company IV was detailed to secure the bridge across the river. The remaining three sections of IV Company covered by the Maxim crossed the bridge and began climbing up the left bank. It was then that the Nandi Kiptaiyet of 500 warrriors appeared. The warriors ran straight at IV Company wheeling to the left. Ignoring the effects of the Maxim, the warriors continued forward until just thirty yards from the Company IV line, they broke. The section left at the bridge crossed over at the first warning and fired into the fleeing warriors. V Company was sent to cut off the warrior's retreat, but was recalled due to the growing darkness.
It had been a near run battle. It had looked at the moment by observers that the IV Company sections would be over-run. But, the Sudanese askaris and their British officers had stood their ground and both participants had experienced the capabilities of the one another. The British learned something of the Nandi discipline, elan, and tactics, and the Nandi learned something about the effectiveness of the gunfire they had never experienced before. However, it had come at a cost to both sides. The Nandi lost over a hundred warriors killed and the British lost fourteen askaris and irregulars killed, including Sergeant Chongo.
On the morning of the 14th, IV and IX Companies were sent out, but saw few of the enemy. Cunningham decided to move his camp across the Kimondi to Kapkobis. The move was made with the loss of only one porter. The column constructed a a five foot thorn enclosure which proved invaluable.
Just before dawn on the 17th, an alarm was given by the sentries who discovered a large Nandi kiptaiyet that had crept within a hundred yards of the enclosure. Incredibly, the warriors were not impressed by the earlier battle, and were now attempting a night attack that had been so successful in the past. This time however, the Nandi discovered that the fire power and thorn enclosure was too much to overcome. Leaving one dead warrior, the Nandi retreated, but succeeded in carrying off the wounded into the night.
After determining that there were no Nandi close, the column moved again on the 17th to a camp at Kipture. At this point large numbers of Nandi warriors were seen, and the local villages were looted for food, but the Nandi did not attack the column as it moved. On the 18th large demonstrations were made by the Nandi that were dispersed by skirmishers as the column moved forward to cross the Mogong and Choimin Rivers. Pieces of bloodied cloth hung from the bridges as a sign of defiance by the Nandi. As the column climbed up the valley of the Choimin large bodies of Nandi were seen and disbursed by the Maxim and skirmishers from the IX Company. The column continued until it was in a heavily populated area and camped on Teito Hill. No attack was launched, but large herds of sheep and goats were seen moving away from the column.
The Nandi changed their tactics beginning on the 19th, when the warriors began harrassing the column as it moved east through thick forest., and wounded several animals and one man in an arrow attack on the column during the night. On the 20th, huge boulders were rolled upon the column as it descended down a narrow trail in the Sagane Valley. That evening arrows rained down upon the camp wounding one man and a cow. The Nandi arrows ceased when the Sudanese returned fire into the darkness. The Nandi managed to spear two followers at a water hole by evading the sentries on the 21st.
These harrassing tactics were aided in demoralizing the column by a driving sleet, mist, cold that enveloped the column when it camped eight miles from Ravine. At this point Cunningham decided to withdraw from Nandi. Lieutenant C. Vandeleur, with fifty men, continued to survey the road, take dispatches for Berkley, and carry two sick askari into Ravine. Miraculously Vandeleur's small column bumped into the Kamasia who offered some food and protection from the Nandi. After reaching Ravine, resting and resupplying, Vandeleur returned to the column camp at Mitete reaching it on November 26, 1895.
Cunningham's porters were beginning to collapse as he began retreating from Nandi. The path to safety required that the column make an arduous march over the steep Tindiret Hills. Two hundred Nandi warriors were seen on the 25th watching from the south as the column looted more villages. However, the Nandi appear to have been waiting an opportunity for revenge as three looters were speared and the Nandi escaped after a detachment of askari were sent into the area. The column camped at Kibbitalet on the 27th, and after a small skirmish in which four Nandi warriors were killed, the column continued on to a site near Mount Endubo on the 29th.
By December 2nd, the collapsing column had climbed the 2,000 feet high escarpment and camped among the granite rocks at Chibonyai. When the column slipped along a muddy path west through the Chesumei Forest, it came under more Nandi arrows. The column reached Kakimno in the middle of the forest on the 3rd. By the 4th the column continued northwest, then turned west. The column reached the safety of the Kavirondo and camped at Ruyi in Tiriki. The Nandi offered one last insult losing two warriors for one wounded askari in a last ambush.
However, what had happened to the Sitwell column? After leaving Guasa Masa, the column had marched south from November 10th through the 11th. On the 11th four Nandi warriors were seen and one was fatally wounded. The column continued marching south and sent search parties for the Cunningham Column on the 13th and 16th. Then Sitwell began a "burned earth" destruction of abandoned Nandi huts and crops. The column turned southwest on the 22nd. At Kitoto's village, the column rested on the 24th through the 26th. On the 27th, the Sitwell Column encountered a strong Nandi bomba and demanded a prize of twenty cattle. The Nandi responded by three attacks on the "fire- raisers" that threw them back.
About 3:00AM, on 28th, the Nandi attacked Sitwell's camp. There was a brief five minute battle which resulted in four Nandi warriors killed for 1,957 rounds fired. The askari lost three killed and five wounded after the Nandi found the entrance to the thorn zariba surrounding the camp. The camp was then strengthened while Sitwell continued to loot and burn until the 30th.
Sitwell decided to retreat on December 1st, and travelling through friendly Mumias territory, through a hail of Nandi arrows and ambushes. Sitwell rested his demoralized column at Kitoto's village for six days. Then he continued to Mumias where he arrived on the 7th. Sitwell reported to Cunningham on December 12th officially ending the First Invasion of Nandi.
The First Invasion had failed "to bring the Nandi to their bearings." The Nandi had lost only 145 warriors (100 in the Battle of Kimondi) and this was not enough to restrain the Nandi warriors from attacking the columns at every opportunity. Cunningham's main column had only captured herds consisting of only 91 head of cattle and 657 sheep and goats. If the main column had failed, Sitwell's flying column had accomplished less. Although it burned a great number of huts and grain fields, it accounted for only nine Nandi warriors killed, one bullock and two goats captured.
Having retrieved both columns, Cunningham reorganized a second phase to the 1st Invasion. Sitwell was dispatched to Kampala and Foaker was ordered to Guasa Masa. This was unique because Cunningham did not request reinforcements. With 410 Sudanese askari, a few Masai guides and a crowd of porters and followers, Cunningham left Mumias on December 14, 1895.
This time the column first moved in a more northernly direction to Sakwa's village, then to Kubras and then easterly to a camp north of Kipsomoitei. It arrived at Kipture on December 19th. A Nandi delegation appeared outside of the camp expressing that they wished to make peace. However, Cunningham became suspicious when the delegation refused to enter the fortified camp and offered to entertain Cunningham at Ravine to discuss terms with the elders. Cunningham refused and probably was a good decision as a follower was ambushed and killed as the "peace" negotiations were being conducted.
As the column marched south-west a new Nandi tactic was encountered at Mogong bridge. The Nandi left a fetish of a live disemboweled goat, a dead chicken, and a hand cut out of leather on the bridge. This could have been an attempt at using magic to defeat the British invaders because another appeared on Christmas morning. However, magic did not deter Cunningham from crossing the bridge and dispatching a company of askari to the south and killing a "few" Nandi and captured some sheep before it came under attack by ambushing Nandi bowmen at the Chomin Ford. The 21st brought a brief skirmish as the main column made a short march to the west. Two companies swept the area west of the camp supported by the Maxim. This resulted in 18 Nandi killed, 94 cattle, and 1200 sheep and goats captured. By the 22nd the column marched into the thickly populated area southwest of Chibonyai having not received any peace emissaries from the Nandi. Indeed, the Nandi were in no mood to conduct negotiations as they attacked a patrol in a running fight that resulted in the loss of three Nandi killed and one Sudanese askari wounded. A large herd of cattle was also captured by the askari in this engagement.
The Nandi surrounded the new camp at Maran in force, but refused to attack. Cunningham sent out two companies with a Maxim that succeeded in killing 22 Nandi, and capturing 94 cattle and 1200 sheep and goats. Cunningham lost one follower killed, one askari wounded and one porter missing. On the 24th, Cunningham marched in a westerly direction and camped at Maraba near the place that Sitwell was attacked earlier. Obviously, Cunningham was attempting to provoke a battle as he razed the numerous huts, losing two askaris who were wounded. Cunningham built a thorn zariba around the camp and waited for the Nandi to take the bait. The Nandi atacked about midnight, but were disbursed by rifle and Maxim fire before they could enter the zariba.
December 26th Cunningham marched the column through some very difficult country with narrow passes that spread the column out. The foremost element of irregulars (Baganda, or Kivirondo, or Uasin Gishu Masai) were attacked by the last Nandi frontal assault. The irregulars fled back upon the column, and for a moment it might have appeared as if the Nandi might succeed in overwhelming the disbursed column. Firing wildly the askaris were able to break the impetus of the charge killing four Nandi.
The column reached Chebilat Hill on the following day and then turned to enter friendly Tiriki country across the Kibos and Sanga rivers. From there Cunningham sent a small force to reopen the road from Mumias to Kitoto's on the 28th against the Maragoli who he considered allies of the Nandi. He fined the chief 50 head of cattle and took two sons hostage as the column passed through friendly Kisa country and returned to Mumias on December 31, 1895.
THE SECOND INVASION OF NANDI
Colonel T. Ternan, Acting Commissioner of the Protectorate of Uganda, decided to turn his attention once more upon the independent Nandi two years after the ineffectual 1895 invasion. This is interesting as on May 16th, 1897 the Nandi chief Teres had arrived at the Ravine Fort wishing peace. Teres was known as one of most hostile chiefs, and Ternan must have contemplated Teres' intentions as a large number of Nandi warriors were gathered near Kipture. At this time, the garrison strengths were fifty askaris (I Company) at Kipture, fifty askaris (VI Company) at Ravine, and twenty-five askaris (VI Company) at Naivasha. Also, the Nandi Laibon was thought to have fled either to Lumbwa or to the Mitete Valley after the 1895 invasion.
Ternan planned a night march that would bring his combined force of over 500 rifles within striking distance of where he thought the Laibon to be located. The Grant column consisted of five Europeans, 220 askaris, 150 porters, 200 Masai irregulars, and a Maxim, and the Ternan column consisted of roughly the same numbers. All the askaris were from the II, IV, and IX Companies.
Surprise was key to Ternan's plan as he hoped that the Teres surrender was evidence that the Nandi coalition was breaking apart. All that might be needed to destroy the confederation of Nandi tribes was the capture of the Laibon. Ternan had some advantages as some of the askaris had been rearmed with Martini-Henry rifles, while others received Sniders providing the Masai irregulars with quantities of the Remingtons, the disadvantage was that all the ammunition was supplied by the Smith, Mackenzie and Company mainly from Buganda and Busoga to Ravine. However, this advantage was off set because the chances of resupply of ammunition in the field were probably unlikely. The large numbers of irregulars was also an advantage, but the Uasin Gishu Masai only knew one path into Nandi. And it was possible to launch a second column from Kipture, but to do this would have negated the element of surprise.
The night of May 17th the column entered Nandi evidently headed for the Kamelilo Valley and then to Ravine where Ternan reorganized his forces. He left forty-eight askaris with Foaker to guard Ravine and assigned twenty askaris to take mail from Nandi to the coast. He issued all the Sudanese and Swahili askaris five days rations, 100 rounds of ammunition, a rifle and bayonet, and a great coat. The askaris who were not in the advance or rear guards were also required to carry their own loads. Then, Ternan organized a porter train to carry fifty-four loads of reserve supplies.
The column left Ravine on the night of June 11th, 1897 along a track that the Masai claimed to be in good shape. However, this proved to be faulty information as the column became reduced to a single file in the dense Mau Forest. As the track disappeared, the advance guard was forced to hack its way forward with bayonets. To make matters worse, the night was cold and this was worsened because the men became wet crossing multiple small swamps along the path. The miserable advance guard was allowed to rest about 2:00AM, June 12th to allow the straggling rest of the column to catch up. Ternan used this time to organize his attack. However, having climbed up hill through the forest, the column faced an equally daunting task hacking its way down through the forest. By the time that the column reached the edge of the forest, the sun had risen and the element of surprise was lost.
As the askaris under Grant and Mackinnon began to move upon the pastoral scene of the surprise attack, they were detected by Nandi scouts who shouted to warn the villagers. All Ternan could do was watch as the villagers and cattle disappeared over the hills. The column captured a few sheep and goats as it entered the valley and established a camp among the abandoned huts to allow the exhausted men to rest. However, the valley wasn't as abandoned as it seemed. A few Nandi warriors lay hidden in the tall grass and killed two foragers looking for wood.
After resting for a day, Ternan burned the huts and moved five miles down the valley to a place near the Laibon's village. The Laibon had fled to Lumbwa and disbursed his herds before the column arrived. All Ternan captured he burned or looted, and then established a camp in hopes that he might lure the Nandi into battle. He sent Grant out with a large patrol into the hills to the east of the camp in search of cattle. Grant was gone for three days and returned with two Nandi prisoners, a "mob" of sheep and goats, but only a few cattle. However, the herds were located in a dense forest.
Jackson led another large patrol into the hills on the south side of the camp. He returned a week later with 49 cattle and 800 sheep and goats. So, deciding that the Nandi were not going to be provoked into attacking the camp, and with a disappointing number of cattle captured, Ternan moved the camp on the 17th to a site a few mile further west. To make matters more disconcerting, the Nandi were present in the valley and were quick to take advantage of any opportunity. Every foraging party suffered casualties, the largest number of five being killed when an armed foraging party of Swahilis was ambushed. Ternan also received letters from Tomkins at Kipture that his scouts had reported that large numbers of Nandi warriors were gathering round Ternan's camp making ready to attack. However, Ternan evidently dismissed these letters, as an attack was what he was hoping for.
By the 20th, when no attack materialized, Ternan decided to withdrawal to return to Entebbe due to an attack by Congolese mutineers on the Salt Lake post, the possibility of the Sudanese mutinying, and the rumors of plans by Baganda chiefs for an uprising. The camp was moved to Kamwentowe. This time Ternan did not burn or loot the village. Grant left with II Company on June 21st for Kipture to "show the flag" on the Kano Plains. The main column followed the Cunningham route to Kipture, arriving there on June 22nd. Upon arriving, Ternan assessed his losses as one Sudanese and five Swahilis killed, two Sudanese and one Masai wounded. He thought that the Nandi had suffered slightly more casualties. The expedition had capture only 137 head of cattle and 1500 sheep and goats.
However, Ternan had not made much of an impression on the Nandi, although the Nandi were made aware that their herds and villages were vulnerable to attacks from stations. Ternan had not been able to defeat the Nandi warriors in battle and the Nandi continued raiding as before. Before Ternan left Kipture on June 28th, he ordered the disbandment of the field force and the return of the askaris to their former posts. He must have realized that the Nandi could not be defeated until a substantially larger military force could be fielded. That would never materialize, and peace terms with the Nandi would finally be negotiated in 1906.
Bibliography
Abbott, Peter. British East Africa, Raider Books, Leeds, UK, c1988. Matson, A. T. Nandi Resistance to British Rule 1890 - 1906, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, Kenya, c1972.
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